





  

 

  

PRESIDENTIAL IDEOLOGY AND
IMMIGRANT DETENTION
CATHERINE Y. KIM & AMY SEMET†
ABSTRACT
In our nation’s immigration system, a noncitizen charged with
deportability may be detained pending the outcome of removal
proceedings. These individuals are housed in remote facilities closely
resembling prisons, with severe restrictions on access to counsel and
contact with family members. Due to severe backlogs in the
adjudication of removal proceedings, such detention may last months
or even years.
Many of the noncitizens initially detained by enforcement officials
have the opportunity to request a bond hearing before an
administrative adjudicator called an immigration judge (“IJ”).
Although these IJs preside over relatively formal, on-the-record
hearings and are understood to exercise “independent judgment,”
concerns have been raised that they are subject to control by political
superiors in the executive branch.
This Article analyzes approximately 780,000 custody decisions by
IJs from January 2001 through September 2019 to explore the question
of political influence over these adjudicators. Its bivariate analyses
based on cross-tabulations, without additional controls, show that
noncitizens have fared worse in bond proceedings during the Trump
administration than they did during the prior two presidential
administrations. Importantly, these differences were not limited to
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decisions rendered by Trump-appointed IJs. Rather, all IJs—
regardless of the president whose Attorney General appointed them—
have been more likely to deny bond or impose a higher bond amount
during the Donald Trump Era than during the Barack Obama or
George W. Bush (“Bush II”) Eras. Although this analysis does not
control for the myriad of demographic, political, economic,
geographic, and institutional factors that could impact decisionmaking, these findings call into question the political independence of
IJs making decisions on noncitizen bonds.
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INTRODUCTION
The detention of noncitizens pending deportation proceedings has
been the subject of considerable controversy. Over the past year alone,
the media has reported on the troubling conditions of confinement,1

1. See, e.g., Quinn Owen, DHS Watchdog Finds ‘Egregious Violations’ at ICE Immigrant
Detention Facilities, ABC NEWS (June 6, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dhswatchdog-finds-egregious-violations-ice-immigrant-detention/story?id=63534100 [https://perma.cc/
B4P5-2LM2] (reporting on violations of government standards including spoiled food, poor
medical care, and “standing-room-only conditions”); Ian Urbina, The Capricious Use of Solitary
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efforts to eliminate time limits for the detention of children,2 and the
diversion of funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”) to finance additional bed space in detention centers.3
In the United States, a noncitizen charged with deportability may
be detained pending the outcome of removal proceedings in
immigration court. The immigrant detention system constitutes the
largest single system for confinement in our nation.4 Almost 400,000
individuals were detained in fiscal year 2018,5 and on any given day,
facilities hold up to 47,000 noncitizens.6 Although immigrant detention
has been characterized as civil rather than penological in nature,7
Confinement
Against
Detained
Immigrants,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
6,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/ice-uses-solitary-confinement-among-detained
-immigrants/597433 [https://perma.cc/425Y-4JMQ] (documenting the arbitrary use of solitary
confinement).
2. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Migrant Families Would Face
Indefinite Detention Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/flores-migrant-family-detention.html [https://perma.cc/
AEU2-BSEE].
3. See, e.g., Julia Ainsley & Frank Thorp V, Trump Admin Pulling Millions from FEMA
Disaster Relief To Send to Southern Border, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2019, 2:48 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-admin-pulling-millions-fema-disaster-relief
-send-southern-border-n1046691 [https://perma.cc/GJG4-ACXZ].
4. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/
odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/A924-7F7N].
5. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 8 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/
pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7EY-FSSJ] (reporting 396,448 initial detentions);
see also KATHERINE WITSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT:
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS:
2017,
at
10
tbl.5
(2019),
https://
IMMIGRATION
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/enforcement_actions_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
3XDF-VDGJ] (reporting 323,591 initial admissions into Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) detention facilities in fiscal year 2017, from a high of 464,190 in fiscal year 2012).
Detentions of individuals from Mexico and the “Northern Triangle” countries of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras constituted 83% of the total. See id.
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT:
OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION ICE-O&S -13
(2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/U.S.%20Immigration%20and%
20Customs%20Enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FZG-MQG7]. In fiscal year 2019, ICE
requested funding for 47,000 immigrant detention beds, including 44,500 adult beds and 2,500
family beds. Id. The prior year it had requested funding for over 51,000 beds. Id.
7. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235, 238 (1896) (invalidating criminal
punishment for unlawfully present noncitizens without a trial, but noting, “We think it clear that
detention or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the
provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens, would be valid”); cf. Jennifer M. Chacón,
Immigration Detention: No Turning Back?, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 621, 623 (2014) (“The glaring
problem with the legal doctrine that constructs immigration detention as nonpunitive is that it is
a fiction. Detention is punitive, and it is experienced as such by immigrants.”); César Cuauhtémoc
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immigrant detention facilities are virtually indistinguishable from jails
and prisons.8 Many noncitizens are held in facilities operated by
private-prison corporations and are in remote locations far from
detainees’ communities.9 There are significant restrictions on access to
counsel10 and contact with family members.11 Substandard conditions
in these facilities have been documented extensively.12 The
government and various media outlets have documented deficiencies
in access to medical services,13 lack of hygiene in bathrooms, and poor
food quality,14 as well as the extensive use of solitary confinement.15
García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349–50
(2014) (identifying similarities between immigrant detention and criminal incarceration); Anil
Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43 (2010)
(suggesting that immigrant detention has evolved into a “quasi-punitive system of
immcarceration”).
8. See SCHRIRO, supra note 4, at 2 (“With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses
to detain aliens were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and sentenced
felons. ICE relies primarily on correctional incarceration standards . . . and on correctional
principles of care, custody, and control.”).
9. Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, A National Study of Immigration Detention in the United
States, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 & tbl.2 (2018). In fiscal year 2015, 10% of detention facilities
were operated by private, for-profit prison corporations, and 67% of all immigrant detainees were
held in such facilities. Id.
10. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2015) (finding that nondetained respondents in
removal proceedings are almost five times more likely to secure representation by counsel than
detained respondents).
11. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE
TREATMENT
AND
CARE
AT
FOUR
DETENTION
FACILITIES
11
(2019),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-06/OIG-19-47-Jun19.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8N72-PSGK]. Unfortunately, in many cases the noncitizen is detained with family members,
including children. See generally Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families:
A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785 (2018) (examining
asylum adjudication for families in detention).
12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, supra note 11 (documenting
results from unannounced site visits at four detention facilities and reporting unhealthy
conditions, absence of outside recreation facilities, and unjustified strip searches, among other
violations); see also generally SCHRIRO, supra note 4 (identifying deficiencies in the management
of the immigrant detention system).
13. See, e.g., SCHRIRO, supra note 4, at 25–26; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-16-231, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN
MANAGEMENT
AND
OVERSIGHT
OF
DETAINEE
MEDICAL
CARE
(2016),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675484.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LKC-Y3DN].
14. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, supra note 11, at 3–4, 8–10 (noting
the failure of ICE facilities to comply with ICE’s food and hygiene standards).
15. Urbina, supra note 1; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-38,
IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD STRENGTHEN DHS EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS
SEXUAL
ABUSE
(2013),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659145.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UEX-SARW].
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Given the severe backlog in the adjudication of removal proceedings,
detention in this system may last months or even years.16
Many of the individuals initially detained by immigrationenforcement officers17—though not all18—have the right to a bond
hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) to argue for their release.19
IJs—the same officials who ultimately determine whether the
noncitizen will be deported—are adjudicatory officials who preside
over formal, on-the-record hearings.20 They are structurally insulated
from enforcement or prosecutorial duties and are understood to
exercise “independent judgment” in their decision-making.21 Yet,
housed within the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), they are explicitly subordinate to the
Attorney General.22 Further, they do not enjoy the tenure protections

16. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 9, at 2 (finding that in fiscal year 2015, the average length of
immigrant detention was thirty-eight days, but “tens of thousands were detained for many months
or years”).
17. Immigration-enforcement officials who apprehend a noncitizen suspected to be
removable make the initial determination as to whether the noncitizen will be detained pending
the outcome of removal proceedings. For those who are not subject to mandatory detention, see
infra note 18, the official may release the noncitizen on conditional parole—release on
recognizance—or on bond of at least $1,500. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1003.19,
1236.1(d)(1) (2019).
18. Congress mandates the detention of certain categories of noncitizens in removal
proceedings, denying any opportunity for bond altogether. These include noncitizens
apprehended at the border, as well as those removable on certain criminal and national security
grounds. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–31 (2003)
(affirming the constitutionality of mandatory detention under section 1226(c)). In Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), the Supreme Court interpreted the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., to preclude any bond hearing for these categories of
detainees even if their detention had been for prolonged periods of over six months. In last term’s
decision in Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019), the Court again interpreted the INA, this time
to mandate the detention without bond of noncitizens arrested by immigration officials years after
being released from criminal incarceration.
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reported that from fiscal year 2011 to
fiscal year 2013, 77% to 80% of noncitizens in detention facilities were subject to mandatory
detention. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION:
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM
EFFECTIVENESS 28 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666911.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZEWEN5V].
19. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.
20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (describing removal proceedings).
21. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (defining “immigration judge” as “an attorney whom the Attorney
General appoints” and who “shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as
the Attorney General shall prescribe”).
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of Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”),23 much less those of Article
III federal judges.24
It is commonly accepted that the decisions of enforcement officials
may, and perhaps should, comply with the policy preferences of the
president.25 But whether adjudicatory decisions, even those made by
23. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS
OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 1, 62–68 (2016) (cataloging different types of
agency adjudications presided over by non-ALJs, including immigration-court hearings); KENT
BARNETT, MALIA REDDICK, LOGAN CORNETT & RUSSELL WHEELER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, SELECTION,
OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL 60–61 (2018) (comparing tenure protections of ALJs with other
agency adjudicators, including IJs); Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New
World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 143–45, 153–57 (2019) (discussing the
“new world” of agency adjudication occurring before non-ALJs and noting the uniqueness of
litigation before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) because its adjudications are not
subject to review by the politically appointed head of the agency).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges “shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall . . . receive . . . Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office”). Immigration law scholars have long recognized the importance of
independence among IJs. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on
Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 385–403 (2006) (articulating the necessity of
independence among the IJ corps); cf. Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative
Law Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV.
475, 481 (2007) (discussing the “tension between the oversight that promotes consistency and
accuracy and the decisional independence of agency adjudicators”).
25. For an examination of the constitutional, historical, and practical scope of presidential
authority over immigration law, see Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 461–63 (2009). See also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus,
Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 962–63 (1998)
(examining the separation-of-powers concerns raised by executive branch detention of
noncitizens). For discussions of presidential control over administrative agencies more generally,
see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical
Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 50–52, 65–70 (2006)
(examining mechanisms for presidential influence over agency decision-making); Rebecca
Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 143 (2018)
(discussing the resistance of career agency officials to presidential control and noting practical
constraints on the bureaucracy’s ability to constrain presidential action); Elizabeth Magill &
Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036–38 (2011)
(analyzing the allocation of power between different agency stakeholders, including politically
appointed agency leadership and civil servants); Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential
Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35
YALE J. ON REG. 549, 610–12 (2018) (identifying concerns associated with presidential control
over agencies); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures As Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 245 (1987) (examining
how agency structure ensures bureaucratic compliance with the desires of political actors); Gillian
E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers,
59 EMORY L.J. 423, 423–26 (2009) (examining how internal constraints on agency action work
with external constraints to check “aggrandized presidential authority”); Gillian E. Metzger &
Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1246–48 (2017) (examining
agency structures, civil service, and professionalism as forming a body of law that constrains
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administrative officials, should be made on the basis of a president’s
political agenda is far more controversial.26 Our constitutional system
places a heavy premium on the independence of adjudications,
reflected in the extraordinary tenure protections afforded to Article III
judges.27 Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall have characterized
adjudicatory independence as the “sine qua non of procedural due
process,” expressing concern that “if the adjudicator is himself an
integral part of the governmental body on the other side of the case,”
then the “government would, in effect, be the judge of its own case.”28
As such, even then-Professor Elena Kagan—who as an academic
championed presidential control over agency decisions29—conceded
that in the context of individual adjudications, “presidential
participation . . . of whatever form, would contravene procedural
norms and inject an inappropriate influence into the resolution of
controversies.”30 Adjudicatory independence is particularly important

executive overreach); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 520 (2015) (examining how the distribution of power between political
appointees and the independent civil service in the modern administrative state produces checks
and balances to constrain agency power); and Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and
the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (1994) (examining the role of the
presidency in agency action).
26. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1300 (1962) (“Everyone, including the
presidential activists, seems to agree that ‘the outcome of any particular adjudicatory matter is . . .
as much beyond . . . [the President’s] concern . . . as the outcome of any cause pending in the
courts . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 33 (1960))); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1211 (2013) (asserting the existence of a “network of
tacit unwritten conventions” protecting agency adjudications from political interference); cf.
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical
Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1480 (2009) (maintaining that a
major issue regarding ALJs is not whether they are sufficiently independent, but rather whether
they are sufficiently deliberative); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today,
46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (1994) (advocating for increased supervision and monitoring over
agency adjudicators); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an
Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. 589, 603–07 (1993)
(proposing a system to evaluate the performance of ALJs); James E. Moliterno, The
Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1191–92, 1209–
34 (2006) (arguing that agency adjudicators should be impartial but not independent).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
28. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986); see also Kent H. Barnett, Some Kind of
Hearing Officer, 94 WASH. L. REV. 515, 524–37 (2019) (discussing the due process interest in nonALJ impartiality).
29. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251–52 (2001).
30. Id. at 2363.
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in the context of immigrant detention decisions, given the explicit
deprivation of liberty as well as the length and conditions of
confinement. At present, however, little is known about whether, as an
empirical matter, IJs comply with the policy preferences of the
president and his political appointees or whether they instead preserve
decision-making independence.31
In earlier work, we evaluated the extent to which IJs operate
independently from their political superiors in rendering the final
decision to remove.32 Using logistic regression and controlling for over
a dozen variables commonly analyzed in assessing deportation
outcomes, we found that the identity of the presidential administration
that appointed the IJ was not a statistically significant factor in
predicting whether or not that judge ordered a noncitizen deported
from the country.33 We did find, however, that the identity of the
presidential administration in control at the time of the removal decision
was a statistically significant predictor of removal outcomes.34 For
example, George W. Bush (“Bush II”) appointees were 22% less likely
to order removal during the Obama Era than during the Trump Era,

31. Scholars outside of the immigration field have examined the independence of agency
adjudicators, focusing largely on political supervision over ALJs. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 3–4 (2017) (examining the decision-making of ALJs within the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”)); Charles D. Delorme, Jr., R. Carter Hill & Norman J. Wood,
The Determinants of Voting by the National Labor Relations Board on Unfair Labor Practice
Cases:1955–1975, 37 PUB. CHOICE 207, 216 (1981) (examining the impact of presidential ideology
on National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) members’ voting patterns); Nicholas R. Seabrook,
Eric M. Wilk & Charles M. Lamb, Administrative Law Judges in Fair Housing Enforcement:
Attitudes, Case Facts, and Political Control, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 362, 363, 373 (2013) (conducting an
empirical assessment of the voting patterns of ALJs assigned to fair-housing cases); Amy Semet,
Political Decision-Making at the National Labor Relations Board: An Empirical Examination of
the Board’s Unfair Labor Practice Decisions Through the Clinton and Bush II Years, 37
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 226–28 (2016) (examining the NLRB’s review of ALJ
decisions); Cole D. Taratoot & Robert M. Howard, The Labor of Judging: Examining
Administrative Law Judge Decisions, 39 AM. POL. RES. 832, 834 (2011) (finding no relationship
between case outcomes of ALJs and the ideology of political superiors at the NLRB); Cole D.
Taratoot, The Politics of Administrative Law Judge Decision Making at the FCC in Comparative
Licensing Cases, 38 JUST. SYS. J. 37, 37–38 (2017) (finding that ALJs at the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) were not subject to political influence by political
superiors in the executive branch); Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges
Biased? An Empirical Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 362 (2017) (finding no evidence that
ALJs within the SEC were biased in favor of the agency).
32. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political Control over
Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. L.J. 579, 579 (2020).
33. Id. at 621.
34. Id.
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and 22% less likely during the Bush II Era than the Trump Era.35 These
results suggest that a sitting president may exert some measure of
direct or indirect influence over IJs’ decisions to deport.
This project shifts our attention from the final outcome of removal
proceedings to the decision to detain pending removal proceedings.
Several studies have examined immigrant detention decisions. In one
of the earliest of these, Janet Gilboy analyzed a sample of cases in
Chicago immigration court in 1983 to examine the rates at which IJs
released noncitizens from detention or reduced bond amounts set by
enforcement officials.36 Other studies, notably those conducted by
Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer37 and by Emily Ryo,38 have identified
various factors that were associated with an IJ’s decision to release a
noncitizen or reduce bond amounts—including attorney
representation, whether the noncitizen was part of a family unit
claiming asylum, criminal history, and national origin, among other
variables. This Article, however, is the first to focus on the potential
for political influence over detention decisions. A given presidential
administration might seek to influence detention decisions through its
power to appoint like-minded IJs who are likely to render decisions in
accord with the administration’s policy preferences or through its
35. Id.
36. Janet A. Gilboy, Setting Bail in Deportation Cases: The Role of Immigration Judges,
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 369–70 (1987) (finding that among a sample of 126 detainees, 95%
obtained a reduction in bond amount—including 16% who were released altogether—and that
bonds were reduced by an average of 68%); see also Robert M. Sanders, Immigration Bond: An
Analysis of the Determinants of Official Decisions, 20 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 156–59
(1993) (examining detention decisions of enforcement officials—rather than IJs—in the Miami
region in the late 1980s to identify factors impacting detention decisions, including criminal
background, financial assets, country of origin, sex, and family status).
37. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 10, at 70 (evaluating the impact of attorney representation
on detention decisions and finding that represented noncitizens were almost seven times more
likely to be released from detention than pro se litigants); see also Eagly et al., supra note 11, at
837–38 (examining the adjudication of claims brought by detained families seeking asylum and
finding that 19% of such families were released from custody, as compared to only 1% of
individuals who were not part of family units).
38. Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
117, 118–19, 146–47 (2016) [hereinafter Ryo, A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings] (examining
a sample of long-term detainees in the Central District of California to find that one of the most
important factors impacting IJs’ custody decisions was the noncitizen’s criminal history, and that
factors relating to flight risk such as family ties or employment were not statistically significant
predictors in immigrant detention decisions); Emily Ryo, Predicting Danger in Immigration
Courts, 44 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 227, 245–48 (2019) [hereinafter Ryo, Predicting Danger]
(analyzing a subset of the earlier sample to find that a noncitizen was more likely to be detained
on the ground of dangerousness if he or she was Central American, proceeded pro se, or had a
history of felony and violent convictions).
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power to supervise IJs—for example, through implicit threats to
employment for decisions that depart from the administration’s
agenda.
Presidential administrations have been explicit in their varied
policy preferences with respect to immigrant detention. For example,
the Barack Obama administration expressed a clear preference for
detaining noncitizens with criminal convictions as well as recent
arrivals.39 The Donald Trump administration, for its part, has
broadened its priorities to maximize the number of noncitizens
detained regardless of whether they have criminal backgrounds.40
Anecdotal reports suggest that IJs have been responsive to those
preferences. One media report describes the policy changes between
the Obama and Trump administrations:
The Obama administration directed immigration judges to use their
discretion to release eligible immigrants on low-cost bonds or without
any bond at all . . . . That is no longer the case under President Donald
Trump . . . . Instead, immigration court judges . . . are increasingly
denying bond requests altogether, or setting them at amounts in
excess of $10,000 . . . .41

39. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et al., Policies for the Apprehension,
Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 3–5 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYV7-WBTC].
40. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017) (announcing the policy of
detaining all individuals suspected of violating immigration laws). President Trump and his
former Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced the end of a policy they termed “catch and
release,” whereby noncitizens were apprehended and then released while their removal
proceedings were pending. See, e.g., Memorandum from the President to Sec’y of State et al.,
Ending “Catch and Release” at the Border of the United States and Directing Other
Enhancements to Immigration Enforcement, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,179 (Apr. 13, 2018); Jeff Sessions,
Att’y
Gen.,
Remarks
on
Immigration
Enforcement
(Apr.
11,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-immigrationenforcement [https://perma.cc/7AMM-BFUF]; Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., Remarks to the
Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal Training Program (June 11, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-officeimmigration-review-legal [https://perma.cc/C28G-BB9H]; Fact Sheets: Trump Administration
Immigration Policy Priorities, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/trump-administration-immigration-policy-priorities [https://perma.cc/
Z4GR-5ZQQ].
41. Daniel Bush, Under Trump, Higher Immigration Bonds Mean Longer Family
Separations, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 28, 2018, 2:38 PM), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/politics/under-trump-higher-immigration-bonds-mean-longer-family-separations
[https://perma.cc/YU4B-WWAM].
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This Article examines IJs’ responsiveness to the policy
preferences of their political superiors within the executive branch. We
analyze government data from approximately 780,000 bond
proceedings held in immigration courts from January 2001 through
September 2019.42 Our study thus covers custody decisions rendered
during the Bush II Era (January 20, 2001 through January 19, 2009),
the Obama Era (January 20, 2009 through January 19, 2017), and the
Trump Era (January 20, 2017 through September 30, 2019). We refer
to each of these periods as presidential “eras.” The data on bond
hearings generally provide detailed information on case outcomes,
including data on whether the individual was released on recognizance,
granted bond, denied bond, or some other decision; the identity of the
IJ who made the decision; and, where bond was granted, the amount
of bond set. We analyze these data to identify descriptive political
trends in bond decisions across different presidential eras. For
example, are noncitizens less likely to be released on recognizance
during the Trump Era as compared to preceding administrations? Are
they more likely to be denied bond altogether? Where bond is granted,
are bond rates higher today than they were during the Obama or Bush
II Eras? We further analyze how different appointee cohorts behave
during each era. For example, do IJs appointed by Clinton differ in
their behavior across different presidential eras?
We find that on every metric of bond hearings, noncitizens fared
worse during the Trump Era than they did during either the Bush II or
Obama Eras. Although rates of release on recognizance were
extremely low throughout the period of study, they started at 2% of all
42. See Frequently Requested Agency Records, U.S. DEP’T JUST., EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR
IMMIGR. REV. (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/frequently-requested-agency-records
[https://perma.cc/XB3V-4K59]. In 2008, TRAC researchers at Syracuse University successfully
filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to force EOIR to release the
data, and EOIR published these data on its website pursuant to reporting standards under the
FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2018)). We limited the analysis to cases involving removal, detention, or exclusion proceedings.
Overall, our analysis of the data indicated that over 99% of the bond proceedings fell within one
of these categories. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 109–23 (2016) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1205666/download [https://perma.cc/
GY7U-CDAH]. We eliminated the bond proceedings for the following case types: (1) “credible
fear” cases, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42 (2019); (2) “withholding-only” cases, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2018);
(3) “reasonable fear” cases involving noncitizens with a reinstated order of removal, 8 C.F.R. §
208.31; (4) “asylum only” cases, 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f); (5) “claimed status review,” 8 C.F.R. §
1235.3(b)(5); and (6) claims under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 203, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193–2200 (1997). Id.; see also IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra, at 118–33. Rescission cases were also excluded.
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cases decided during the Bush II Era, dropping to 0.23% during the
Obama Era and then to 0.17% during the Trump Era. Similarly, while
only 7% of custody hearings during the Bush II Era resulted in an
outright denial of bond, that figure rose to 14% during the Obama Era
and 18% during the Trump Era. Perhaps more telling, overall
noncitizen win rates—release on, granting of bond when ICE denies
bond, or lower bond amounts—indicate that all appointee cohorts
were less likely to award relief to noncitizens during the Trump Era
than during the Obama Era. For example, while IJs appointed during
the George H.W. Bush (“Bush I”) Era granted a favorable outcome to
the noncitizen in 38% of all cases between 2001 and 2019, they awarded
such relief in only 12% of cases during the Trump Era. Although this
analysis does not control for other factors, these preliminary, bivariate
results suggest that presidents may influence bond decisions not only
through their power to appoint more like-minded IJs, but also through
their power to supervise earlier appointees.
An examination of bond amounts set by IJs reveals a similar
picture. Bond medians grew from $5,000 during the Bush II Era to
$6,500 during the Obama Era, and then jumped to $8,000 during the
Trump Era. Indeed, 43% of the bonds set by IJs during the Trump Era
were $10,000 or higher, as compared to only 24% and 25% for the
Obama and Bush II Eras, respectively. Again, breaking down these
results by appointee cohort indicates that earlier-appointed IJs mostly
issued higher bond amounts during the Trump Era than during
preceding administrations.
Our bivariate analyses do not control for other factors that might
independently influence bond decisions. We do not control for the
multitude of potential independent variables such as the individual
circumstances of the noncitizen (including whether he or she is part of
a family unit or was represented by counsel), the demographic
characteristics of the IJs, changes in migration patterns, the
sociopolitical or socioeconomic contexts in which bond decisions are
made, geographic factors related to the court location, or the
institutional behavior of other political actors like Congress, the circuit
courts, or the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).43 As such, our
conclusions are purely descriptive and do not seek to make causal
inferences. They do, however, show trends that indicate statistically
significant differences and raise the question of whether IJs are
43. Unlike the current analysis, in our analysis of removal decisions, we controlled for these
variables. Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 607–18.
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politically independent. We hope that these findings will encourage
further research into the factors that shape, and those that should
shape, immigrant detention decisions.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the legal and
policy context in which immigrant custody decisions are rendered in
immigration courts. Part II sets forth our analyses. Part III considers
avenues for further research. We conclude with some thoughts on the
appropriate role of political actors in immigrant detention decisions.
I. THE LEGAL AND POLICY CONTEXT FOR IMMIGRANT DETENTION
This Part sets forth the legal and policy context for immigrant
detention decisions. Section A summarizes the legal framework in
which immigrant detention decisions are made. Section B describes
how political preferences for immigrant detention have shifted through
the Bush II, Obama, and Trump administrations.
A. The Legal Framework
Immigrant detention occurs in the context of removal proceedings
that determine whether a noncitizen can be removed from the country
and, if so, whether his or her case warrants a discretionary grant of
relief from removal. Noncitizens within the United States are
removable where, for example, their presence is unauthorized—
perhaps because they entered without inspection or overstayed a
visa44—or where they are lawfully present but engaged in conduct that
renders them deportable, such as criminal activity.45 These individuals
generally are entitled to a relatively formal hearing to determine
whether they will in fact be removed.46 At these hearings, the
noncitizen is entitled to be represented by private counsel, to present

44. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(7), 1227(a)(1). Visa overstays account for approximately 40% of the
undocumented population. Fact Sheets: Enforce Immigration Laws Across the United States,
WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/enforceimmigration-laws-across-united-states [https://perma.cc/X42J-85YV]. In fiscal year 2016, 628,000
noncitizens overstayed their visas. Id.
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
46. See id. § 1229a (describing removal proceedings). Some noncitizens are not entitled to
formal removal proceedings and are instead subject to “expedited removal.” See id. § 1225(b)(1)
(applying expedited removal to certain categories of noncitizens lacking proper documentation
or engaged in fraud); id. § 1225(c) (extending expedited removal to individuals posing a threat to
national security).
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evidence and witnesses, to cross-examine evidence and witnesses, and
to a formal record of the proceedings.47
Noncitizens often do not contest the grounds for removal, and
their individual merits hearings typically focus on whether the
immigration court will grant relief from removal.48 Congress has
legislated various forms of discretionary relief, including “asylum”
where the individual establishes a “well-founded fear of persecution”
on one of five protected grounds;49 “waivers” of various grounds for
removability;50 and “cancellation of removal” where the noncitizen
satisfies a list of statutory eligibility factors.51 For decades, noncitizens
could also seek a form of relief called “administrative closure,” which
removed a case from the immigration court’s active docket where, for
example, the noncitizen would soon qualify for legal residence through
a family member or was in the process of litigating a direct challenge
to a criminal conviction that formed the basis for removal.52 Given the
significant evidentiary burdens on noncitizens in seeking these forms
of relief53 and the staggering backlog of pending cases,54 these removal

47.
48.

See id. § 1229a(b)(4).
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, MARYELLEN
FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 723
(8th ed. 2016).
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining the term “refugee”); id. § 1158 (setting forth
procedures for granting asylum to individuals within the United States or at the U.S. border who
meet the statutory definition of “refugee”). Individuals may file for asylum affirmatively, before
removal proceedings have been initiated, or defensively, after removal proceedings have been
initiated. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-72, ASYLUM: VARIATION EXISTS IN
OUTCOMES OF APPLICANTS ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 1–2 (2016),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680976.pdf [https://perma.cc/24B4-TY2S] .
50. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii), (a)(1)(H), (a)(7) (setting forth waiver
categories).
51. Id. § 1229b.
52. The Trump administration curtailed the use of administrative closure as an option for
IJs. In In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018), the Attorney General exercised
his refer-and-review authority to overturn BIA precedent acknowledging the propriety of
administrative closure. The Fourth Circuit overturned In re Castro-Tum in Romero v. Barr, 937
F.3d 282, 297 (4th Cir. 2019), preserving the availability of this form of discretionary relief in that
circuit.
53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (imposing burden on noncitizen to show that relief from
removal is warranted).
54. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 22, 25–26 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/690/685022.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC3T-VKQY] (describing increases in initial casecompletion times and the resulting case backlog).
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proceedings often take years to resolve.55 A crucial question for
noncitizens, then, is whether they will be detained pending the
completion of those proceedings.56
When an individual is initially apprehended on suspicion of
removability,57 enforcement officials within the Department of
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) agency make the initial determination as to
whether the individual will be detained.58 Congress has imposed
mandatory detention for certain categories of noncitizens, including
those apprehended at the border59 and those who are removable on
certain criminal and national security grounds.60 For those who are not
subject to mandatory detention, ICE exercises discretion to release the
noncitizen on conditional parole (also known as release on
recognizance), set a bond of at least $1,500, or deny bond altogether.61
55.
56.

See id.
For an overview of the statutory framework for immigrant detention, see generally
HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45915, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: A LEGAL
OVERVIEW (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45915.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF34-LHDK].
57. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2019). ICE officials are also responsible for representing the
government in prosecuting the noncitizen during removal proceedings. IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 42, at 2.
58. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (setting forth regulations for detention of noncitizens prior to order
of removal).
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). DHS enforcement officials retain authority to release these
noncitizens through a grant of humanitarian parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). For many years, the BIA concluded
that arriving noncitizens who lack proper documentation—and are thus “subject to expedited
removal”—and who can establish a credible fear of persecution to form an asylum claim were not
subject to mandatory detention and remained eligible for release on bond if they were
apprehended at a port of entry, but not if they were apprehended between ports of entry. In re
X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 732 (BIA 2005). Attorney General William Barr overruled that decision
in In re M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (Att’y Gen. 2019). The Western District of Washington,
however, has concluded that individuals apprehended in the nation’s interior and subject to
expedited removal are constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ if they establish a
credible fear of persecution. Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219,
1223, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2019), aff’d in part, 2020 WL 1482393 (9th Cir. 2020).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). These individuals may be released only for witness-protection
purposes. Id. § 1226(c)(2).
61. Id. § 1226(a); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1 (setting forth regulations for detention of
noncitizens prior to ordering removal). Conditional parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B)
differs from humanitarian parole pursuant to § 1182(d)(5). Conditional parole allows the release
of a noncitizen who is subject to discretionary detention provisions and may impose conditions
on release. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B). Humanitarian parole allows the release of any arriving
noncitizen, including those subject to mandatory detention, but only where such release is for an
“urgent humanitarian reason or significant benefit.” Id. § 1182(d)(5). Conditional parole may be
granted by either DHS officials or an IJ; humanitarian parole can only be granted by DHS
officials. See In re Castillo-Padilla, 25 I. & N. 257, 260–61 (BIA 2010).
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An individual who has been detained by enforcement officers,
however, has a right to appeal that initial custody determination by
seeking a bond hearing before an IJ.62 Like the ICE officials before
them, IJs have authority to release the noncitizen on conditional
parole, set a bond amount, deny bond altogether, or issue another
decision.63 Children are subject to different detention rules.64
Although IJs are also responsible for adjudicating the question of
whether the noncitizen ultimately will be removed,65 regulations
provide that bond proceedings must be “separate and apart from, and
shall form no part of” the removal proceeding.66 The IJ may consider
any information available to him or her in rendering the custody
decision.67 A noncitizen may subsequently request an additional bond
hearing after the first, but only upon showing that circumstances have
materially changed.68
At the start of October 2019, there were 442 IJs serving across the
United States—the most in U.S. history.69 IJs possess many of the
powers associated with ordinary judges; for example, they are
authorized to administer oaths, receive evidence, examine and cross62. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19; see also id. § 1236.1(d) (allowing noncitizens to request amelioration
of release conditions). Such hearings are sometimes referred to as “bond redetermination
hearings” or “custody redetermination hearings.” Noncitizens subject to mandatory detention
generally are not entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ. See id. § 1003.19(h)(1)(i). A noncitizen
may seek a Joseph hearing for the IJ to determine whether he or she falls within one of the
categories for mandatory detention. See In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (BIA 1999).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d) (providing that requests for amelioration
of custody conditions are made to IJs); id. § 1003.19(a) (providing that custody and bond
determinations are reviewable by IJs).
64. In a class action lawsuit over juvenile detention, the government entered into a
settlement agreement in 1997 known as the Flores Settlement imposing time limits on the
detention of juveniles. See Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863, 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the
Flores litigation and settlement). The Trump administration has taken the position that those
limits apply only to unaccompanied juveniles, not to children traveling with parents. 84 Fed. Reg.
44,392 (Aug. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212, 236). See generally Peter Margulies,
What Ending the Flores Agreement on Detention of Immigrant Children Really Means, LAWFARE
(Aug. 29, 2019, 5:39 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ending-flores-agreement-detentionimmigrant-children-really-means [https://perma.cc/LG6H-YF3D] (describing shifting policies on
the detention of immigrant children).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 1003.19(e).
69. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for
Immigration Review Announces Case Completion Numbers for Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-office-immigration-review-announces-case-completionnumbers-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/PH7C-YHJR].
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examine witnesses, issue subpoenas, and hold individuals in
contempt.70 IJs do not possess enforcement or prosecutorial
responsibilities. Rather, they are designed to be independent and
apolitical. Indeed, regulations provide: “In deciding the individual
cases before them, and subject to the applicable governing standards,
immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and
discretion . . . .”71 Due process may well mandate such independence
given the liberty interests at stake in detention decisions.
Despite these norms of adjudicatory independence, IJs are
executive branch officials subordinate to the Attorney General. The
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) explicitly provides they
shall be appointed by the Attorney General and “subject to such
supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General
shall prescribe.”72 IJs do not enjoy the tenure protections of ALJs
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).73 Instead, their
independence is protected only to the extent of ordinary civil service
laws.74
Outside of the mandatory-detention context, the Supreme Court
has authorized the detention of a noncitizen pending removal
proceedings on two grounds only: (1) to ensure the noncitizen appears
for removal proceedings75 or (2) for public-safety reasons.76 Circuit
courts frequently affirm that immigrant detention is warranted only
where the noncitizen poses a flight risk or danger to the community.77
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2018).
71. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10.
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4).
73. See supra note 23.
74. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 135, 137 (2008),
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L44T-C599]
(detailing
an
investigation into the hiring of IJs, “which are career positions protected by the civil services
laws”); see also Legomsky, supra note 24, at 372–79 (describing civil service protections of IJs and
the BIA).
75. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–28 (2003) (noting that detention “necessarily
serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their
removal proceedings”).
76. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541, 544 (1952) (sustaining the detention of
Communist noncitizens in removal proceedings for public-safety reasons).
77. See, e.g., Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 224 & n.12, 226
n.15 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that detention is permitted only if a noncitizen “poses a risk of
flight or a danger to the community” or if an “alien’s release or removal is imminent” (first
quoting Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated by Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S.
Ct. 1260 (2018) (mem.); then quoting Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir.
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IJs may consider a wide range of factors in determining flight risk or
public-safety risk, including whether the noncitizen has a fixed address
in the United States, length of U.S. residence, family ties, employment
history, record of court appearances, criminal record, history of
immigration violations, prior attempts to flee, and manner of entry into
the United States.78 IJs enjoy a great deal of discretion in determining
which factors to consider.79 The IJ’s discretion is further enhanced by
the lack of federal court review over detention decisions. The IJ’s
decision is subject to review by the BIA,80 but the INA provides that
decisions “regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant,
revocation, or denial of bond or parole” shall not be subject to judicial
review.81
B. Policy Preferences of Political Superiors Within the Executive
Branch
IJs are understood to exercise “independent judgment” based on
the record of the proceedings, but they may, nonetheless, be
susceptible to deciding cases in accordance with the policy preferences
of their political superiors in the executive branch. The Bush II,
Obama, and Trump administrations each took public positions with
respect to immigrant detention, which might have influenced IJs in
deciding individual cases.

2011))); Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that detention depends
on whether a noncitizen “present[s] a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national
security, and does not pose a risk of flight” (quoting In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA
2006), abrogated on other grounds by Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D.
Mass. 2018))); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding that
Congress intended for immigrant detention to “prevent[] flight and recidivism”); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.1(c)(8) (2019) (noting that an arresting officer may release certain noncitizens provided that
such release would not pose a danger and that the noncitizen is likely to appear for future
proceedings); id. § 1236.1(c)(8) (applying the same standard of release to noncitizens not covered
under § 236.1(c)(8)); In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1111–13 (BIA 1999) (applying 
§ 236.1(c)(8)), abrogated by Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D. Mass. 2018)
(holding that the burden of proving flight risk or dangerousness lies with the government, not the
noncitizen).
78. In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40.
79. Id. at 37; see also Carlson, 342 U.S. at 543 (noting that the Attorney General is vested
with wide discretion as to bail in cases involving noncitizens).
80. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2018). The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that noncitizens retain
the right to habeas review to challenge their detention as a violation of the U.S. Constitution or
federal statute. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (holding that § 1226(e) does not bar
habeas review).
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In 2006, President George W. Bush announced his
administration’s policy preference for detaining noncitizens entering
the United States without documentation, ending the “catch-andrelease” policies of the past, and increasing detention capacity.82 At the
same time, however, he urged Congress to enact comprehensive
immigration reform to grant a path to lawful status for longtime
undocumented residents, implicitly suggesting that these individuals
should not be deported, much less detained.83
The Obama administration expressed policy preferences that
were somewhat more complex, ultimately broadening the categories of
noncitizens who would be prioritized for detention. Like his
predecessor, President Obama urged Congress to enact comprehensive
immigration reform;84 indeed, he went further to announce a policy of
granting deferred action, a form of relief from removal, for individuals
brought to the United States as children85—and then for parents of U.S.
citizens and legal residents86—as long as they passed certain
requirements, including criminal background checks.87 Under these
new policies, millions of noncitizens were shielded from removal and,
as a corollary, detention. At the same time, however, the Obama
administration prioritized the detention not only of recent arrivals as
the Bush II administration had, but also noncitizens with criminal
backgrounds.88 The administration also piloted a risk-assessment tool
in 2013 to systematize which noncitizens would be detained as a danger
82. President George W. Bush, Speech on Immigration (May 15, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/15/washington/15text-bush.html [https://perma.cc/7TRA-MCKZ].
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, News Conference (Nov. 14, 2012),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1156
[https://perma.cc/U2MP-ZLFW].
85. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-presidentimmigration [https://perma.cc/CR6K-TMFQ] (announcing the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program).
86. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/5PX2-PPGS] (announcing the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program).
87. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 2 (June 15,
2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individualswho-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G59-FV7F]; Memorandum from Jeh Charles
Johnson, supra note 39, at 3–5.
88. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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or a flight risk.89 Then, in 2014, the administration adopted a policy of
detaining, without the possibility for release, the growing numbers of
unaccompanied minors and families who crossed the Southern Border
seeking asylum from Mexico or Central America.90
The Trump administration adopted an even broader approach to
immigrant detention, announcing a policy of detaining all noncitizens
charged with removal. Within one week of his inauguration, President
Trump issued an executive order explicitly stating his administration’s
policy of detaining all noncitizens suspected of violating immigration
laws.91 In February of that year, the administration issued a directive to
all ICE employees—but not IJs—to detain all noncitizens pending
removal proceedings except in narrow circumstances.92 It continued,
“There is no presumption that an individual alien’s release would not
pose a danger or risk of flight.”93
In April of 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions addressed a
group of DHS’s Customs and Border Protection officers and stated,
“Pursuant to the President’s executive order, we will now be detaining
all adults who are apprehended at the border.”94 Then, on October 12,

89. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT INTEGRATED DATABASE (EID) RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT (RCA
1.0), ENFORCE ALIEN REMOVAL MODULE (EARM 5.0), AND CRIME ENTRY SCREEN (CES 2.0),
at 3–4 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_piaupdate_EID_april2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XTT3-FBAB] (describing the new, automated Risk Classification Assessment
tool). For a detailed description and criticism of the Risk Classification Assessment tool, see
generally Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 45 (2014).
90. See Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from
Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 185 (2016) (“[I]n the summer of 2014, DHS
adopted a policy of detention without the possibility for release on bond for mothers and children
arriving from Central America to seek asylum in the United States.”); see also id. at 212 (“After
an initial period when the DHS insisted on continued detention [of Central American mothers
and children] without potential for release on bond, DHS began setting across-the-board bond
amounts as a condition of release.” (footnote omitted)). These individuals were subject to
mandatory detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2018), but DHS officials—though not
IJs—retained authority to release them on humanitarian parole, see supra note 61.
91. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
92. Memorandum from Matthew T. Albence, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enf’t, to All Enf’t & Removal Operations Emps., Implementing the President’s Border
Security and Interior Immigration Enforcement Policies 1–3 (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-memo-on-implementing-the-presidents-border [https://perma.cc/
9Z46-62NQ].
93. Id. at 3.
94. Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., Remarks Announcing the Department of Justice’s Renewed
Commitment
to
Criminal
Immigration
Enforcement
(Apr.
11,
2017),



2020]





  

 

IMMIGRATION DETENTION

  

1875

2017, then-Attorney General Sessions addressed IJs directly,
complaining about the Obama administration’s policy of releasing
noncitizens who demonstrated a fear of persecution.95 He asserted,
“Not surprisingly, many of those who are released into the United
States . . . simply disappear and never show up at their immigration
hearings.”96 More recently, the Trump administration has
demonstrated a policy preference for simply turning away asylum
claimants seeking entry at the Southern Border, rather than detaining
them within the United States.97
The extent to which IJs, as opposed to enforcement officers, are
responsive to the policy preferences of political appointees in the
executive branch remains to be seen. Media reports based on anecdotal
evidence suggest that they are.98 This study seeks to examine whether
bivariate analyses, without additional controls, show statistically
significant differences in IJs’ bond decision-making based on either (1)
the president whose Attorney General appointed the IJ; or (2) the
sitting presidential administration.99

https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcingdepartment-justice-s-renewed [https://perma.cc/7S8R-N3RP].
95. Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (Oct.
12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarksexecutive-office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/4XBV-J2EP].
96. Id.
97. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to L. Francis
Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al., Policy Guidance for Implementation
of the Migrant Protection Protocols (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/
T855-8JN7] (describing the announcement of “Migrant Protection Protocols” to require asylum
claimants to remain in Mexico pending adjudication of their claims in immigration court).
98. See Bush, supra note 41 (noting that the practice of setting large bonds for detained
immigrants appears to have grown under the Trump administration); Mica Rosenberg & Reade
Levinson, Trump’s Catch-and-Detain Policy Snares Many Who Have Long Called U.S. Home,
REUTERS (June 20, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usaimmigration-court [https://perma.cc/DQ5R-KESX] (concluding that immigration officials are
increasingly denying bond under the Trump administration); see also Alejandro Fernández
Sanabria, Inti Pacheco & Antonio Cucho, Costly Bonds: For Undocumented Immigrants, Bail
Depends on a Judge’s Subjectivity, UNIVISION NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018, 3:41 PM),
https://www.univision.com/univision-news/immigration/costly-bonds-for-undocumented-immigrants
-freedom-depends-on-a-judges-subjectivity
[https://perma.cc/VF2U-DQZN]
(offering
descriptive information that bond amounts differ by the ideological leanings of IJs).
99. Specifically, the analysis is done using a chi-square test to analyze whether two variables
are independent. If differences were random, we would expect 95% of the resulting p-values to
be greater than 0.05. Here, many of the results have a p-value below 0.05, indicating statistical
significance.
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II. ANALYSIS
We reviewed EOIR records to examine political trends in IJs’
bond decisions. This Part begins with an overview of how we
constructed our dataset. It then sets forth our findings from two
analyses: changes in “win rates” for noncitizens and changes in the
bond amounts set by IJs. This analysis is done in a bivariate manner
without additional controls to see if the measures differ significantly by
(1) the president whose Attorney General appointed the IJ; and (2) the
president in control at the time the decision was rendered, across the
three most recent presidential administrations.
A. Construction of the Dataset
We obtained from the EOIR’s website records of every bond
hearing in immigration courts from January 20, 2001, through
September 30, 2019.100 These records identify the IJ before whom the
request was made, the date of the IJ’s decision, the decision itself, and
if bond was granted, the bond amount. Where the bond amount was
missing in the EOIR data, we imputed the amount. 101
We used two approaches to code for the IJ’s bond decision. First,
we determined whether the decision was favorable to the noncitizen.
In this specification, which we call “Custody Hearing Outcomes,” we
coded the decision as a “win” if the IJ released the noncitizen on
recognizance, granted bond if ICE denied bond, or set a bond amount
that was lower than the amount previously set by ICE to the best we
were able to discern that information. In the second specification,
which we call “Bond Amounts Set by IJ,” we examine the specific bond
amounts set by IJs to the extent they could be gleaned from the data,
categorizing them as “low” if they were $2,500 or lower and “high” if
they were $10,000 or higher.
For each specification, we examine changes through time—
specifically, during different presidential eras. Custody decisions
100. See infra Appendix for further discussion of how the EOIR records were obtained and
how the analysis was conducted.
101. We found many internal inconsistencies in EOIR’s coding on the old and new bond
amounts. For example, some cases coded as a “no bond” decision actually had a dollar amount
listed in the “new bond” column. We treated such decisions as no bond cases and excluded the
dollar amount from further analysis when calculating the IJ’s bond. There was also much missing
data, particularly for initial ICE bond amounts. Missingness in the data cannot be ignored because
there could be a correlation between the missing data and a given decision, IJ, court location, or
some other factor. Some IJs, for example, may always record the data, while others do not. We
explain in the Appendix how we imputed data for missing data.
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rendered from January 20, 2001, through January 19, 2009, were coded
as “Bush II Era.” Custody proceedings decided from January 20, 2009,
through January 19, 2017, were coded as “Obama Era.” Cases decided
from January 20, 2017, through September 30, 2019, were coded as
“Trump Era.” This analysis shows differences across eras in rates at
which IJs as a whole granted a favorable custody decision to
noncitizens as well as how the bond amounts set by IJs differ across
eras.
For each era, we further analyze the behavior of different cohorts
of appointees. For example, during the Trump Era, we compared the
bond decisions of Trump appointees, Obama appointees, Bush II
appointees, Clinton appointees, Bush I appointees, and Reagan
appointees. This exercise allows us to show descriptively whether there
are statistically significant differences in the way cohorts of judge
appointees made decisions on bond redeterminations during different
eras, though without controlling for other variables.
Importantly, our study is limited to using cross-tabulations to
conduct bivariate analyses. Unlike our prior analysis on politicization
in the removal process,102 we do not conduct a multivariate regression
analysis, nor do we control for other variables that might impact an IJ’s
custody decision.103 As such, this study does not attempt to identify
predictive values or causal relationships. Rather, our much more
modest goal is to provide a descriptive picture of IJs’ custody decisions,
examining potential differences in the decision-making of IJs during
different presidential eras as well as between different appointment
cohorts.
B. Custody Hearing Outcomes
We first measure “Custody Hearing Outcomes,” meaning the
rates at which the noncitizen was released on recognizance, obtained
bond for the first time if ICE granted no bond, received a lower or
higher bond amount, was denied bond altogether, or achieved another
outcome. Table 1 shows changes in these rates across appointee
cohorts for the full period of study.
Overall, the rates at which IJs granted release on recognizance
were notably low; only 0.62% of custody decisions between January

102. Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 621.
103. See infra Part IV(A) (describing other variables that might influence IJs’ custody
decisions).
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2001 and September 2019 fell into this category.104 IJs were more likely
(41%) to issue a favorable ruling for the noncitizen by granting bond
for the first time or by lowering the initial bond amount.105 On the loss
side, IJs denied bond altogether in 13% of the cases, appeared to
increase bond in 2% of cases, took no action in 31% of the cases, and
indicated no change in bond amount in 11% of the cases.106
1. Differences Between Appointee Cohorts—All Eras. We first
examine differences between groups of appointees across all eras from
January 20, 2001, through September 30, 2019, reflected in the top
section of Table 1. For example, did IJs appointed by Trump behave
differently than those appointed by Obama or Bush II? This analysis
examines trends in the relationship between the appointing president
and bond outcomes, providing percentages of the given outcomes
broken down by appointee cohort.107

104. Scholars have reported that some IJs conclude they lack authority to grant release on
recognizance. See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 90, at 189–90.
105. More often, the initial bond amount was missing, so when the bond decision was coded
“new amount,” it was impossible to tell whether the IJ set a higher or lower bond amount. It was
also impossible to determine whether ICE denied bond altogether. If the decision code indicated
that the noncitizen was released and the bond amounts were missing in cases where the IJ set a
new bond amount, we assumed that the IJ issued a favorable decision for the noncitizen by
granting bond for the first time or by lowering the initial bond amount. If the amount remained
missing, we imputed the median bond based on the presidential era and either bond base city or
IJ. See infra Appendix. In alternative specifications, we did an imputation analysis for all the
missing data and did not assume that the IJ bond amount was lower than the ICE amount if the
noncitizen was released and the data missing. In those specifications, approximately 10% of
relevant IJ decisions had a higher bond amount than the amount set by ICE. We saw the same
general trends in the data using this and other alternative imputed measures.
106. EOIR’s coding does not explain the distinctions between the “no action” and “no
change” categories.
107. These figures are across the entire range of the study. For example, the figures for Obama
appointees are from 2009–2019, while the figures for Trump appointees are only from 2017–2019.
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TABLE 1: CUSTODY HEARING OUTCOMES AND WIN RATES,
BY APPOINTEE COHORT
All
App.

Trump
App.

Obama
App.

Bush II
App.

Clinton
App.

Bush I
App.

Reagan
App.

Release

0.62

0.12

0.13

0.22

1.18

0.93

0.93

Lower $

41.17

37.62

44.56

41.70

41.71

36.88

31.22

Win Rate

41.80

37.74

44.69

41.92

42.89

37.82

32.15

Higher $

2.31

0.98

1.91

2.46

2.55

2.55

2.88

No Action

31.34

39.16

30.46

29.65

30.75

34.49

34.70

No Change

11.32

7.10

6.37

13.06

11.72

14.54

21.76

No Bond

13.22

15.03

16.57

12.91

12.09

10.61

8.51

Loss Rate

58.20

62.26

55.31

58.08

57.11

62.18

67.85

IJs appointed by earlier administrations in our study were more
likely to grant release on recognizance than more recently appointed
IJs. It has been reported that some EOIR documents tell IJs that they
may lack the power under INA § 236 to grant conditional parole; such
beliefs may be depressing the percentages for own recognizance
rulings.108 Throughout the time period of study, Clinton, Bush I, and
Reagan appointees granted release on recognizance in about 1% of the
cases, while IJs appointed by Trump, Obama, or Bush II granted
release in 0.2% of cases or less, perhaps reflecting disparities over time
in the use of own recognizance rulings. Surprisingly, Obama appointees
were no more likely to grant release on recognizance than their Trumpappointed counterparts. Throughout the years of study, Trump and
Obama appointees granted release in 0.12% and 0.13% of cases,
respectively.
But an examination of overall win rates yields a slightly different
picture, as shown in Figure 1.109 Obama and Clinton appointees had the
108. See Andrea Saenz, Not Dangerous, but Too Poor To Get Out of Detention,
CRIMMIGRATION.COM (Sept. 8, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/09/08/notdangerous-but-too-poor-to-get-out-of-detention [https://perma.cc/T2PU-DVTR] (noting a DOJ
online resource for IJs); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EOIR - IJ BENCHBOOK - TOOLS GUIDES - BOND GUIDE 3 (2013), https://federaldefendersny.org/IJ%20Benchbook%20%20Tools%20-%20Guides%20-%20Bond%20Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FV6C-56C9]
(“Section 236(a) of the Act does not provide for the release of an alien on the alien’s own
recognizance.”). We have no reason to believe that such beliefs are correlated with appointee
cohort or era.
109. Not everyone who prevails in a bond hearing is ultimately released. Some lack the
financial ability to pay bond.
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highest win rates; they granted a favorable outcome for the
noncitizen—release, set a bond for the first time if ICE denied bond,
or lower the bond amount—in 45% and 43%, respectively, of their
custody hearings. Trump appointees were less likely than Obamaappointed IJs overall to grant relief; they did so only 38% of the time,
a result statistically significant at 95% confidence. But they were not
the least likely to grant relief among appointee cohorts across the time
frame of the study: IJs appointed by Reagan were less likely to grant
relief (32%) to the requesting noncitizen to a statistically significant
degree. One possible explanation for this trend would be if ICE
enforcement officers set lower bond amounts in the first instance
during the earlier years, and higher initial bond amounts more recently.
FIGURE 1: WIN RATES, BY APPOINTEE COHORT
.5

% Noncitizen Win Rate

.4

.3

.2

.1

Trump
Obama
Bush II
Clinton
Bush I
Reagan

0

At the opposite end of the spectrum, we look at the likelihood of
denying bond outright. Again, both Trump appointees and Obama
appointees were far harsher to noncitizens than any other group of
appointees. Across all eras, about 15% of cases decided by Trump
appointees and 17% by Obama appointees resulted in no bond being
issued at all, as compared to 12% for IJs appointed by the four other
presidents in the study, a result statistically significant at 95%
confidence. These findings are reflected in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2: NO BOND DECISIONS, BY APPOINTEE COHORT
.2

% No Bond
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These findings suggest that IJs appointed by Trump are among the
strictest in their decision-making compared to IJs appointed by earlier
presidents. Perhaps surprisingly, Obama appointees are comparably
strict, at least in terms of the rates at which they granted release and
the rates at which they denied bond altogether.
2. Differences Across Presidential Eras. Next we look at
differences in bond outcomes across different presidential eras for all
appointees, reflected in Table 2. Were IJs as a whole—regardless of
who appointed them—less likely to grant relief to noncitizens during
the Trump Era than prior eras? This analysis offers descriptive
information on the extent to which a presidential administration could
potentially influence IJs through the power to supervise.
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TABLE 2: CUSTODY HEARING OUTCOMES AND WIN RATES,
BY PRESIDENTIAL ERA
Trump Era

Obama Era

Bush II Era

Release

0.17

0.23

1.74

Lower $

39.70

43.20

38.60

Win Rate

39.88

43.43

40.34

Higher $

1.26

2.10

3.61

No Action

34.01

30.70

30.30

No Change

6.67

9.70

18.31

No Bond

18.19

14.07

7.44

Loss Rate

60.12

56.57

59.66

Interestingly, overall win rates were lower to a statistically
significant degree during the Trump Era (40%) than during the Obama
Era (43%). The overall win rates by presidential era are reflected in
Figure 3. But rates of release from recognizance were considerably
lower during both the Trump and Obama Eras (0.17% and 0.23%,
respectively) as compared to the Bush II Era (2%), a result statistically
significant at 95% confidence in the bivariate analysis.
FIGURE 3: WIN RATES, BY PRESIDENTIAL ERA

% Noncitizen Win Rate
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Bush II Era
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Similarly, in terms of the percentage of cases that resulted in bond
being denied outright, noncitizens fared worse as time progressed.
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Only 7% of custody hearings resulted in a denial of bond during the
Bush II Era, rising to 14% during the Obama Era and to 18% during
the Trump Era. These results are reflected in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4: NO BOND DECISIONS, BY PRESIDENTIAL ERA
.2

% No Bond
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.05
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Bush II Era
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3. Differences Across Presidential Eras and Appointees. Finally,
and most importantly, we examine how different cohorts of appointees
behaved during different eras. These data are reflected in Table 3.
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TABLE 3: CUSTODY HEARING OUTCOME AND WIN RATES,
BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA
Trump
App.

Obama
App.

Bush II
App.

Clinton
App.

Bush I
App.

Reagan
App.

Trump Era
Release

0.12

0.13

0.13

0.48

0.10

0.23

Lower $

37.62

43.17

39.55

33.70

11.76

20.90

Win Rate

37.74

43.30

39.68

34.18

11.86

21.13

Higher $

0.98

1.45

1.16

1.17

0.87

0.83

No Action

39.16

30.70

33.41

38.73

55.93

27.08
41.39

No Change

7.10

5.73

6.60

5.76

2.80

No Bond

15.03

18.82

19.16

20.16

28.54

9.57

Loss Rate

62.26

56.70

60.32

65.82

88.14

78.87

Obama Era
Release

—

0.13

0.14

0.40

0.39

0.14

Lower $

—

45.53

44.69

42.36

41.34

31.79

Win Rate

—

45.65

44.83

42.75

41.73

31.93

Higher $

—

2.23

2.44

1.80

1.89

1.83

No Action

—

30.30

28.72

31.56

33.76

33.98

No Change

—

6.82

11.32

8.29

13.26

23.08

No Bond

—

15.01

12.69

15.59

9.36

9.17

Loss Rate

—

54.35

55.17

57.25

58.27

68.07

Bush Era
Release

—

—

0.56

2.18

1.41

1.48

Lower $

—

—

34.22

42.56

34.98

31.53

Win Rate

—

—

34.79

44.74

36.39

33.01

Higher $

—

—

3.64

3.64

3.17

3.69

No Action

—

—

29.28

28.31

33.72

35.66
19.63

No Change

—

—

24.12

16.68

16.26

No Bond

—

—

8.17

6.65

10.46

8.01

Loss Rate

—

—

65.21

55.26

63.61

66.99

During the Trump Era, Obama appointees issued more favorable
bond decisions to noncitizen detainees than any other group of
appointees. They granted relief to noncitizens in 43% of cases, as
compared to the 37% win rate for IJs appointed by any other president
ruling during the Trump Era, a result statistically significant at 95%
confidence. Trump and Bush II appointees also had higher win rates
(38% and 40%, respectively) for noncitizens during this era than
appointees of all other presidents besides Obama. Surprisingly, then, it
was the earlier-appointed cohorts—those appointed by Clinton, Bush
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I, and Reagan—who exhibited the lowest win rates during the Trump
Era. These discrepancies could be explained by the higher percent of
“no action” or “no change” decisions by Bush I and Reagan appointees
in particular.
Moreover, many of these same earlier appointees were far more
sympathetic to noncitizens during the preceding eras than during the
Trump Era. For example, IJs appointed by Clinton granted relief to
noncitizens in 34% of the cases they heard during the Trump Era, but
in 44% of cases in prior years, a result statistically significant at 95%
confidence. Even more stark, Bush I appointees granted relief to
detainees in only 12% of cases during the Trump Era even though they
granted such relief in 39% of cases in prior years, again a statistically
significant result. Reagan appointees had a statistically significant win
rate of 21% during the Trump Era compared to 33% prior. Bush II
appointees are the exception to this trend; although Bush II appointees
had a lower win rate during the Obama Era than the Trump Era (45%
during Trump Era versus 40% during Obama Era), they had their
lowest win rate during the Bush II Era (35%). These findings, showing
changes in behavior during different presidential eras amongst the
same cohort of judges, suggest that it is possible the Trump
administration could be exercising some influence over IJs through its
supervisory authority. These findings are reflected in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5: WIN RATES, BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA
.5
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C. Bond Amounts Set by IJs
Next, we examine changes in the bond amounts set by IJs. As an
initial matter, we analyze median bond amounts by appointee cohort
and presidential era.110 These data are reflected in Table 4.
TABLE 4: MEDIAN BOND AMOUNTS,

BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA
All
App.

Trump
App.

Obama
App.

Bush II
App.

Clinton
App.

Bush I
App.

Reagan
App.

Trump Era

$8,000

$10,000

$7,500

$10,000

$7,500

$10,000

$10,250

Obama Era

$6,500

—

$7,000

$7,000

$5,000

$5,000

$8,000

Bush II Era

$5,000

—

—

$7,000

$5,000

$7,500

$5,000

All Eras

$7,000

$10,000

$7,500

$7,500

$5,000

$6,500

$7,500

Bond medians grew throughout the three eras in our study,
starting at $5,000 during the Bush Era, rising to $6,500 during the
Obama Era, then jumping to $8,000 during the Trump Era. Trump
appointees have had a median bond amount of $10,000, but all the
appointee cohorts exhibited a higher median bond amount during the
Trump Era than either the Obama or Bush II Eras. IJs appointed by
Bush II, for example, set a median bond amount of $7,000 during the
Bush II and Obama Eras; this amount jumped to $10,000 during the
Trump Era. The biggest jump occurred for Bush I appointees—$5,000
during the Obama Era to $10,000 during the Trump Era. These
findings suggest that although bond amounts grew overall as time
passed, they grew at a faster rate under the Trump administration.111
Data for the rates at which IJs set low, medium, or high bond amounts
are set forth in Table 5.

110. We used median bond amount rather than mean bond amount because the median is less
affected by IJs who may issue bond amounts in the extreme. We excluded IJ bond amounts when
the bond decision was “no bond” or release on own recognizance as erroneously coded. Trends
are similar using the original, nonimputed data with missing values.
111. These changes do not account for changes in inflation over the nearly twenty-year period
of study, nor do they account for shifts in the bond amounts initially set by enforcement officials
across time and region. These factors would contribute to the general tendency for bond to
increase over time, but that would not necessarily negate political influence as a potential
contributory factor in the overall trend of higher bond amounts.
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Looking only at differences between cohorts of appointees,
reflected in the top section of Table 5 and Figure 6, we see that Trump
appointees were more likely than appointees from other cohorts to set
a bond of $10,000 or more (“high bond”). Across the entire period of
study, about 53% of the bond decisions by Trump appointees, as
compared to 30% for Obama appointees and 28% Bush II appointees,
resulted in high bonds. The inverse was also true to some extent:
Trump appointees were less likely to set bond at $2,500 or lower (“low
bond”) than Obama appointees, for example (2% versus 3% overall).
TABLE 5: BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES,

BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA
All
App.

Trump
App.

Obama
App.

Bush II
App.

Clinton
App.

Bush I
App.

Reagan
App.

All Eras
$2,500 & Lower

4.85

1.59

3.17

4.24

7.13

4.60

3.96

$2,501-$9,999

66.87

45.31

66.52

67.74

69.83

61.19

68.05

$10,000 & Higher

28.27

53.10

30.31

28.02

23.03

34.20

27.99

Trump Era
$2,500 & Lower

2.37

1.59

2.71

1.88

3.28

1.36

0.33

$2,501-$9,999

54.81

45.31

62.01

42.11

65.00

20.33

14.05

$10,000 & Higher

42.82

53.10

35.28

56.00

31.72

78.31

85.62

$2,500 & Lower

4.78

—

3.48

4.54

6.83

3.78

2.22

$2,501-$9,999

71.36

—

69.56

73.51

73.21

61.58

67.85

$10,000 & Higher

23.87

—

26.96

21.96

19.96

34.64

29.93

Obama Era

Bush II Era
$2,500 & Lower

6.92

—

—

5.19

8.12

5.44

5.32

$2,501-$9,999

68.29

—

—

70.54

67.21

62.99

71.81

$10,000 & Higher

24.79

—

—

24.27

24.67

31.57

22.87
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FIGURE 6: BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES, BY APPOINTEE COHORT
.8

% Bond Amounts
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.2
$2,500 & Lower
$2,501-$9,999
$10,000 & Higher
0

Trump Obama Bush II Clinton Bush I Reagan

Next, we examine differences in bond amounts across presidential
eras. These data are reflected in Figure 7. Consistent with the findings
on median bond amounts, we find that high bonds were more frequent
during the Trump Era than the preceding eras. About 43% of bonds
set by IJs during the Trump Era were $10,000 or more, as compared to
only 24% for Obama Era and 25% for the Bush II Era. Conversely, the
percentage of cases in which a low bond was set declined through the
three presidential eras to a statistically significant degree, constituting
7% of cases during the Bush II Era, 5% of cases during the Obama
Era, and 2% of cases during the Trump Era.
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FIGURE 7: BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES, BY PRESIDENTIAL ERA
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We then examine high bond amounts and low bond amounts by
appointee cohorts across the three presidential eras. These data are
presented in Figures 8 and 9.
FIGURE 8: HIGH BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES ($10,000 AND HIGHER),
BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA
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FIGURE 9: LOW BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES ($2,500 AND LOWER),
BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA
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% Low Bond
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0
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Most appointee cohorts were more likely to issue a high bond
amount during the Trump Era than during the preceding two
administrations. Bush II appointees, for example, set a bond of $10,000
or higher in only 24% of cases during the Bush II Era, declining slightly
to 22% of cases during the Obama Era, and jumping to 56% of cases
during the Trump Era, a difference statistically significant at 95%
confidence. Interestingly, during the Trump Era, Bush II, Bush I, and
Reagan appointees were even more likely to issue a high bond amount
than Trump appointees during the same time frame. These findings
show that bond amounts set by IJs have risen considerably during the
Trump administration, and all cohorts of judges have behaved more
harshly during the Trump Era than during prior eras.
*   *   *
Our descriptive findings show that along every metric of bond
hearings, noncitizens appear to have fared considerably worse during
the Trump Era than they did during either the Obama or Bush II Eras.
Perhaps most telling, overall win rates indicate that all appointee
cohorts were less likely to award relief to the noncitizen during the
Trump Era than during the Obama Era. Although the analysis does
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not control for other factors that could mitigate the impact of
presidential influence, these results raise the question of whether the
Trump administration is influencing IJ decision-making in bond
decisions through its power to supervise earlier appointees.
An examination of bond amounts set by IJs reveals a similar
picture. Without controlling for inflation or initial amounts set by ICE,
bond medians grew from $5,000 during the Bush II Era to $6,500
during the Obama Era, and then jumped to $8,000 during the Trump
Era. Indeed, 43% of the bonds set by IJs during the Trump Era were
$10,000 or higher, as compared to only 24% and 25% for the Obama
and Bush II Eras, respectively—differences that are statistically
significant. Again, breaking down these results by appointee cohort
and era indicates that earlier-appointed IJs have behaved more harshly
during the Trump Era than during preceding administrations.
III. MAPPING FUTURE RESEARCH
In the preceding section, our analysis suggested that immigration
bond decisions may be shaped in part by a sitting president’s political
agenda. This Part identifies two directions for future research. First, it
proposes further study to determine whether our findings remain
robust after controlling for other factors that otherwise impact
immigrant custody decisions. Second, it encourages a renewed
exploration of which factors should shape these decisions.
A. Controlling for Potentially Confounding Variables
Our assessment of the role of presidential politics in individual
immigrant custody decisions employs simple bivariate analyses and
does not control for the myriad of other factors that may influence such
decisions. A predictive study seeking to isolate and measure the role
that political superiors play in immigrant detention outcomes would
need to control for a wide variety of factors, including the legal factors
that IJs are instructed to consider, as well as extralegal factors that may
be shaping decision-making without legal grounds.
To evaluate whether detention decisions are a product of political
influence rather than, for example, legally relevant factors relating to a
noncitizen’s dangerousness or flight risk, one would need to see
whether our findings remain robust after controlling for variables such
as the noncitizen’s family ties, length of U.S. residence, employment
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background, financial situation, and criminal history.112 EOIR
currently does not reliably code for these factors, but prior studies
indicate at least some of these variables may be statistically significant
predictors of IJs’ custody decisions.113 Such a study would also need to
control for factors that are not legally relevant but may nonetheless
influence IJs’ custody decisions.114 For example, Eagly and Shafer have
found that attorney representation plays a significant role in
determining whether a noncitizen remains detained or not.115 Ryo has
found that the noncitizen’s national origin was a significant predictor
of detention decisions.116 Outside of the detention context, scholars,
including the authors, have identified other variables that have a
statistically significant effect in predicting immigration decisions,
including (1) factors related to the noncitizen, including not only
attorney representation and national origin, but also criminal history,
language, continent of origin, and whether the noncitizen arrived from
a politically intolerant or poor country; (2) factors related to the IJ,
such as gender, prior work experience, or tenure on the bench; (3)
factors related to the base city of the hearing, including whether the
case was heard at a large base city, whether the base city was located
at the Southern Border, and the base city’s political and economic
climate; and (4) factors related to other institutional actors such as
Congress, the circuit courts, and the BIA.117 Although the immigrant-

112. See In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (providing a nonexhaustive list of
factors that may be considered by IJs in rendering custody decisions), abrogated on other grounds
by Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D. Mass. 2018).
113. See Ryo, A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, supra note 38, at 119 (finding a
noncitizen’s criminal history to be statistically significant in predicting immigrant detention
decisions).
114. See Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 596–600 (citing scholarship identifying factors that
predict immigration removal decisions).
115. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 10, at 70 (finding that noncitizens represented by counsel are
almost seven times more likely to be released than pro se counterparts); see also Ryo, A Study of
Immigration Bond Hearings, supra note 38, at 143 (finding presence of counsel to be a statistically
significant predictor of IJ custody decisions).
116. Ryo, Predicting Danger, supra note 38, at 239 (finding, in a sample of immigrant
detention decisions from 2013 to 2015, that Central Americans were 68% more likely to be
detained because they pose a danger to the community than those from countries in other
regions); see also Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment,
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 450–51, 505–15 (1992) (describing deficiencies in
language translation in immigration courts).
117. See, e.g., BANKS MILLER, LINDA CAMP KEITH & JENNIFER S. HOLMES, IMMIGRATION
JUDGES AND U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 99 tbl.4.2, 100 (2014) (analyzing factors); Daniel E. Chand,
William D. Schreckhise & Marianne L. Bowers, The Dynamics of State and Local Contexts and
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detention context differs from the criminal pretrial-detention context
in important respects,118 scholarship examining the factors that play a
role in a judge’s decision to release a criminal defendant from pretrial
detention provide useful guidance as well. Criminal justice scholars
have found, for example, that bond decisions vary based on factors
such as caseload pressures119 and the availability of bed space in
detention facilities.120
Changes in bond decision-making may also result from factors
entirely exogenous to the immigration courts, such as shifts in
migration patterns. For example, prior to 2014, the majority of
noncitizens in detention were from Mexico; the years since have
witnessed a surge in detainees seeking asylum from the “Northern
Triangle” countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Similarly, the behavior of ICE enforcement officials may shift IJ
custody decisions. For instance, in the past, ICE set uniformly high

Immigration Asylum Hearing Decisions, 2017 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 182, 182, 188–89,
188 fig.1, 193 tbl.5. (same); Linda Camp Keith, Jennifer S. Holmes & Banks P. Miller, Explaining
the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates Among Immigration Judges: An Attitudinal and Cognitive
Approach, 35 L. & POL’Y 261, 278–80, 279 fig.1 (2013) (same); Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at
628–29 (same); Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933,
957, 958 fig.5 (2015) (same); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 10, at 70 (same); Jaya Ramji-Nogales,
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,
60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 342–49 (2007) (same); Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Measuring In Absentia
Removal in Immigration Court, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (same); Daniel L. Chen &
Jess Eagel, Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of Asylum Adjudications? 1, 6 tbl.3
(Proceedings of the Ass’n for Computing Mach. Conference on Artificial Intelligence & the Law,
Working
Paper,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2815876
[https://perma.cc/4JW9-AE4R]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS
JUDGES 7, 36, 119, 120 tbl.19, 121 tbl.20, 123–24 (2008) (same),
AND
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AY7J-FD5T];
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-72, supra note 49, at 62 tbl.10, 63 tbl.11 (2016) (same).
118. See Gilman, supra note 90, at 206–09 (identifying important differences between pretrial
criminal detention and detention pending immigration removal proceedings).
119. Katherine Hood & Daniel Schneider, Bail and Pretrial Detention: Contours and Causes
of Temporal and County Variation, 5 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 126, 129–30 (2019)
(discussing studies suggesting that caseload pressure shapes pretrial decisions in criminal
proceedings (citing Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian Johnson, Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel
Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 137 (2004) and Brian Johnson, Contextual Disparities in Guidelines
Departures: Courtroom Social Contexts, Guidelines Compliance, and Extralegal Disparities in
Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2005))).
120. Id. at 130 (citing ROY B. FLEMMING, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: AN
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON FELONY BAIL PROCESSES (1982)).
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bond rates for women detained in particular facilities.121 Those high
bond amounts may have had an anchoring effect on the IJs’ subsequent
review of the bond amount. Changes in ICE enforcement patterns may
also impact the types of cases IJs hear. For example, cases decided
during the Obama administration, which sought to prioritize the
removal of criminal noncitizens,122 would likely have had a higher
proportion of such noncitizens in the pool of immigrants seeking bond
hearings. By contrast, we might expect to see a lower proportion of
criminal noncitizens in bond hearings during the Trump administration
given its policy of enforcement against all noncitizens who may be
removable.123 Nor can we reliably code for whether the noncitizen has
a criminal record or how such a record would affect outcomes.124 These
case-selection effects could alter custody outcomes even if IJs—as
opposed to enforcement officials—were entirely independent from
their political superiors in the administration.
Changes in caseload volume could also impact custody
determinations, as IJs may have less time for individualized
considerations of the legally relevant factors and default to categorical
thinking based on their own predilections and policy preferences or
those of their political superiors. As of October 2019, according to the
EOIR, there were over 980,000 cases pending on the courts’ dockets,
up from 430,000 in 2014.125
Future research should determine whether the findings reported
above remain robust after controlling for these other variables that
likely have an independent effect on immigrant custody decisions. Such
research would then move closer to identifying and measuring the
extent to which IJs’ custody decisions are a function of a given

121. See Gilman, supra note 90, at 211 (identifying FOIA records to show that “DHS sets the
same bond amounts for all individuals in custody at a particular detention facility or in a particular
region during a specific time period”).
122. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 39 (prioritizing the removal of
criminal noncitizens and those apprehended at the border).
123. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 30, 2017) (stating the policy of
enforcing immigration laws “against all removable aliens”).
124. Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 619–20 (“[Whether] the noncitizen was charged under 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)—listing crime-based grounds for inadmissibility and
deportability, respectively—would not reliably indicate whether the noncitizen had a criminal
background.”). ICE prosecutors typically charge noncitizens with the ground or grounds that are
easiest to prove, not necessarily the most serious ground for removal. Id. at 620.
125. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: PENDING
CASES (2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1060836/download [https://perma.cc/9UBPZ3AB].
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president’s political agenda rather than an independent assessment of
record evidence.
B. The Search for Factors that Should Determine Immigrant
Detention
A second avenue for future research would be to identify the
factors that should be used in immigrant custody hearings. Such
findings could produce fairer and more accurate detention decisions.
They would also aid the government’s efforts to establish a “risk
classification assessment” to systematize the factors IJs would use in
determining whether a noncitizen will be detained.126
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has authorized the detention
of noncitizens pending removal proceedings on two grounds only: to
protect the community from danger—public safety127—and to ensure
the noncitizen’s appearance at further removal proceedings—flight
risk.128 It has emphasized, however, that detention may not be used as
punishment.129
As an initial matter, deterring future migrants, in our view, should
play no role in immigrant custody decisions. Deterrence is a rationale
for penological incarceration; it cannot be a ground for detention
pending removal. But presidential administrations have periodically
defended immigrant detention precisely on such grounds, asserting
that such detention is necessary to deter others from seeking to enter
the United States.130 The District Court for the District of Columbia

126. Cf. Noferi & Koulish, supra note 89, at 58–72 (criticizing the current assessment tool for
failing to accurately predict bail risks). We recognize that in the criminal pretrial-detention
context, such assessments have been shown to perpetuate structural bias and inequality. Sandra
G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2296–97 (2019). Nonetheless, such assessments
could be used to provide additional support for, rather than additional detention of, individuals
found to be high risk. Id. at 2225–26, 2286–93.
127. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541, 544 (1952) (sustaining the detention of Communist
noncitizens pending deportation proceedings for public-safety reasons).
128. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–28 (2003) (sustaining mandatory detention on the
ground that it “necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from
fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings”).
129. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235, 237–38 (1896) (holding that although
detention is a valid action in enforcing immigration laws, noncitizens cannot be subjected to
punishment such as hard labor or confiscation of property without a judicial trial establishing
guilt).
130. See Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 238–40 (2019)
(tracing the history of administrations’ use of immigrant detention to deter migration); Julia
Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-largest-immigration-
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has cast doubt on such reasoning, rejecting the notion that “one
particular individual may be civilly detained for the sake of sending a
message of deterrence to other Central American individuals who may
be considering immigration” as “out of line with analogous Supreme
Court decisions” reserving deterrence goals for the criminal justice
system.131
Additionally, from a normative perspective, one should question
whether concerns that the noncitizen would endanger public safety if
released constitute a valid ground for detention pending removal
proceedings. Unlike in the criminal pretrial context, noncitizens in
removal proceedings need not have been accused of any crime at all—
they may simply be removable because they overstayed a visa, for
example. Even for those who are removable on the basis of criminal
conduct, detention pending the outcome of removal proceedings
generally occurs only after the noncitizen has already served the full
criminal sentence deemed appropriate for the crime.132 Detaining them
further due to their immigration status under these circumstances
begins to look punitive.
Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Carlson v. Landon133 is
instructive in this regard. In that case, noncitizens were charged with
removal on the basis of their membership in the Communist Party.134
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court sustained their detention for the
purpose of preventing them from “aid[ing] in carrying out the
objectives of the world communist movement.”135 Justice Black
dissented, reasoning, “Since it is not necessary to keep them in jail to
assure their compliance with a deportation order, their imprisonment
cannot possibly be intended as an aid to deportation. . . . A power to
put in jail because dangerous cannot be derived from a power to
deport.”136 Justice Black would have permitted immigrant detention
only for the purpose of effectuating removal.137 For him—and for us—
detention-center-in-us.html
[https://perma.cc/C7KJ-NYWN]
(describing
the
Obama
administration policy of using family detention as a deterrent).
131. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2015); see also Aracely v. Nielsen,
319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 153–54 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting the deterrence rationale for immigrant
detention).
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018) (directing that noncitizens convicted of specified crimes be
taken into immigration custody “when the alien is released” from criminal custody).
133. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
134. Id. at 528–29.
135. Id. at 544.
136. Id. at 551 (Black, J., dissenting).
137. See id.
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immigrant detention to prevent crimes impermissibly reaches beyond
the core justification for the confinement of noncitizens in this context:
to facilitate their deportation.
As for the detention of individuals for the purpose of ensuring
their appearance for removal proceedings, IJs currently may consider
the noncitizen’s length of residence in the United States, family ties,
employment background, and prior efforts to abscond from law
enforcement.138 But none of these factors have been empirically shown
to predict the likelihood that a noncitizen will appear for removal
proceedings.139
It is worth noting here that the necessity of using detention at all,
at least in the vast majority of cases, remains unclear. Although it is
true that detaining a noncitizen guarantees his or her later appearance,
recent scholarship shows that noncitizens’ appearance rate is high even
without detention. For example, scholars found that 96% of families
seeking asylum attended all of their hearings after being released from
detention.140 Other mechanisms such as electronic monitoring and
periodic check-in requirements may also be effective in increasing the
likelihood of appearance in immigration court.141 The danger of
erroneously detaining someone absent a flight risk is particularly acute
in the immigration context, where a noncitizen with a valid claim to
remain in the United States might opt to abandon that claim simply to
end the period of detention.
It is also possible that additional factors should be considered in
assessing flight risk. For example, a noncitizen’s likelihood of
ultimately obtaining relief from removal may be relevant in calculating
flight risk. It stands to reason that if a noncitizen has no colorable claim
to relief from removal, then he or she is more likely to abscond to avoid
inevitable removal. By contrast, a noncitizen with a strong claim to
relief from removal is likely to attend removal proceedings that will
lead to lawful presence in the United States. Indeed, the current
138. In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (providing a nonexhaustive list of factors
that may be considered by IJs in rendering custody decisions), abrogated on other grounds by
Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684 (D. Mass. 2018).
139. See Gilman, supra note 90, at 206 (“No empirical research has taken place to identify
factors that accurately predict the risk of flight or danger presented by a migrant in deportation
proceedings.”).
140. Eagly et al., supra note 11, at 848.
141. AUDREY SINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45804, IMMIGRATION: ALTERNATIVES
TO DETENTION (ATD) PROGRAMS 7–9 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45804.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TZZ4-W46F]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-26, supra note 18,
at 8–10, 30.
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system, which does not generally consider likelihood of ultimate
relief,142 creates a perversion in the immigrant detention system. Those
with the strongest legal claims to remain in the United States are the
ones most likely to remain detained. An individual with a weak legal
claim may well decide to abandon it in the face of detention, but
individuals would likely tolerate lengthy detentions in oppressive
conditions if they truly and reasonably feared persecution if
repatriated, for example.
Another factor that might be considered is the noncitizen’s ability
to pay a bond amount. Policies that impose the same bond amount on
entire categories of noncitizens make little sense because a wealthier
noncitizen may be able to post the bond amount easily and care little
for losing the bond if he or she absconds, while a poorer noncitizen may
be detained simply because of his or her inability to pay.143 Pursuant to
a class action lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit, IJs in that circuit—but only
that circuit—are required to consider ability to pay in setting bond
amounts.144
Our findings on the relationship between presidential
administrations and outcomes in individual detention decisions suggest
that future research is warranted to further identify the factors that
shape IJs’ detention decisions, as well as the factors that should shape
such decisions.
CONCLUSION
The prospect of politicized custody decisions challenges the very
core of our notions of due process. Even those who view the ultimate
decision to deport noncitizens as being vested exclusively in the
political branches should chafe at the suggestion that the decision of

142. Cf. In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40 (omitting the likelihood of ultimate relief in a list
of factors to consider in determining immigrant custody but noting the list is nonexhaustive). But
see United States ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Dir. of Immigration & Naturalization, 169 F.2d 747, 751
(2d Cir. 1948) (identifying the likelihood of ultimate removal as a permissible factor in immigrant
detention decisions).
143. ACLU Analytics & Immigrants’ Rights Project, Discretionary Detention by the Numbers,
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/discretionarydetention [https://perma.cc/6BLU-ZUC6] (showing rates at which noncitizens remain detained
due to inability to post bond amount).
144. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2017).
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whom to detain—for spans of months or even years—should be
directed by an individual president’s political agenda.145
There may be some role, however, for executive branch political
officials, at least under the current system in which IJs are housed in
the executive branch.146 Political supervisors might legitimately act to
reduce arbitrariness and disparities in custody decisions. After all, such
disparities arguably compromise rule-of-law norms. Political actors
within the executive branch might properly engage in notice-andcomment rulemaking to promulgate regulations specifying the types of
factors IJs should consider in their detention decisions. Alternatively,
the Attorney General might identify such factors through his or her
power to refer BIA cases to himself or herself and formally review
them.147 Where such actions do not exceed statutory bounds and do not
compromise individual due process interests, they may legitimately
limit the adjudicatory discretion of IJs.
By contrast, efforts by the president, the Attorney General, or any
other political subordinates to sway IJ decisions by simply directing IJs
to detain more immigrants or set uniformly high bond amounts would
raise due process concerns. They would also result in the pointless
expenditure of considerable funds to detain someone who poses little145. Cf. Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the
Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 KAN. L. REV. 541, 541 (2011) (arguing that the lack of
decisional independence among IJs “only scratches the surface” of the many problems associated
with immigration court adjudication).
146. A growing number of scholars and organizations have endorsed moving immigration
proceedings into a new Article I court. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, 2019
UPDATE REPORT: REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE
INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF
REMOVAL CASES, at UD 6–14 (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/commission_on_immigration/2019_reforming_the_immigration_system_volume_2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7GVT-BY72] (endorsing the creation of an Article I court to handle
removal adjudication); Jill Family, Injecting Independence and Proportionality into Immigration
Adjudication, in AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, RETHINKING ADMIN LAW: FROM APA TO Z 45, 49
(2019), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Rethinking-Admin-Law-From-APA-toZ.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND7K-S4X5] (same); Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Statement of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association Submitted to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Border Security and Immigration Hearing on “Strengthening and Reforming America’s
Immigration Court System” 1–2 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/ailacorrespondence/2018/aila-statement-on-strengthening-and-reforming [https://perma.cc/7EMZNW85] (same); Article I Immigration Court: Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration
Court, FED. BAR ASS’N, https://www.fedbar.org/government-relations/policy-priorities/article-iimmigration-court [https://perma.cc/YBB4-UC64] (same). Stephen Legomsky has proposed an
alternative structural reform, creating a new, independent Article III immigration court. Stephen
H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1686–87 (2010).
147. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2019).
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to-no flight risk. A solution to mitigating decisional disparities that opts
to uniformly deny bond or consistently set unrealistically high bond
amounts, without any individualized assessment of the person’s flight
risk or dangerousness, raises significant due process concerns. A better
approach would be to impose stronger guidelines on the factors that
should be considered in determining whether the noncitizen should be
detained or released. Uniformity need not bend toward more
detention.
*   *   *
APPENDIX
The data for this Article is available to the public on EOIR’s
website.148 EOIR maintains an electronic case-management system of
its data.149 EOIR also publishes a “Lookup File” that describes the
codes used in its documents. Each EOIR case has a case number
(labeled “idncase”) with potentially multiple proceeding numbers
(“idnproceeding”). To determine the bond decision, we relied on the

148. See supra note 42. We primarily used the “D_TblAssociatedBond” file (“Bond Table”)
as the base table. We then merged in additional CSV files, including: (1) the “[T]bl_[S]chedule”
file (“Schedule Table”) to determine hearing-level information; (2) the “A_TblCase” (“Case
Table”) to identify information on case type and custody status; (3) the “B_TblProceeding” file
(“Proceeding Table”) to identify information on case type and custody status; (4) the
“[T]bl_[L]ead/[R]ider” file (“Lead/Rider Table”) to discern case IDs for the cases that were leads
and riders indicating family units; (5) the “[T]bl_CustodyHistory” file (“Custody Table”) to see
custody status and dates; and (6) the “[T]bl_JuvenileHistory” file (“Juvenile Table”) to identify
juvenile cases.
149. Prior to 2007, this system was called the “Automated Nationwide System for
Immigration Review” (“ANSIR”), and after, the system was updated to the “Case Access System
for EOIR” (“CASE”). See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE IMMIGRATION COURTS AND THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS 2 n.2, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/include/08-EOIR_asylum_disparity_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFJ8-7RTA] (explaining the then-upcoming switch from ANSIR to
CASE in fiscal year 2007). This change in reporting impacted our dataset since some information
was not consistently coded throughout the time of study. In addition, TRAC has noted significant
discrepancies in the data EOIR releases to the public. See Incomplete and Garbled Immigration
Court Data Suggest Lack of Commitment to Accuracy, TRAC (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/580
[https://perma.cc/W7BX-T9TK].
EOIR
has
responded that it has no duty under FOIA to “certify” the accuracy of its records. Id. The GAO
has launched an investigation. GAO To Probe Missing DOJ Immigration Records, LAW360 (Mar.
4,
2020),
https://www.law360.com/immigration/articles/1238391/gao-to-probe-missing-dojimmigration-records [https://perma.cc/2454-3PSP]. By necessity, our analysis is limited to the
extent any information provided by EOIR is incomplete or inaccurate. We relied on the files
released in October 2019, February 2020, and March 2020 to complete this analysis.
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variable “dec” in the “Bond Table.”150 We narrowed the dataset in a
few ways. First, we included only the first substantive bond decision.151
Second, we included only bond hearings that occurred in the context
of removal proceedings, deleting the 1% of cases that were associated
with nonremoval cases. Third, we eliminated the cases in which the IJ
concluded that they lacked jurisdiction. A lack of jurisdiction would
occur where the noncitizen was ineligible for release because they were
subject to mandatory detention statutes. If there was more than one
hearing and if the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction during the first
hearing, we used the next hearing in which there was a substantive
bond decision, provided the decision was after January 19, 2001.
Fourth, we deleted custody cases heard by Carter and Nixon
appointees to simplify the analysis. Fifth, we eliminated all proceedings
heard by IJs who decided less than fifty bond proceedings. We also
eliminated proceedings heard by an individual who had not yet been
formally appointed as an IJ, as well as those heard by IJs for whom we
were not able to obtain reliable biographical information. Sixth, we
eliminated proceedings in which custody status was listed as “never
detained.”152 It is possible that in those cases, the noncitizen had never

150. Bond decisions are coded as follows in the EOIR database: (1) no action (“A”); (2) new
amount (“C”); (3) “no jurisdiction” (“J”); (4) no bond (“N”); (5) own recognizance (“R”); or (6)
no change (“S”). Data tables produced by EOIR in response to a FOIA request indicate that
decisions coded as “G,” “D,” “O,” or “F” are not valid. Cases with these invalid codes mostly
involved pre-2001 cases and any post-2001 cases with these codes were dropped. The Bond Table
has thousands of entries lacking data on the presiding judge, base city, hearing location of the
cases, and the completion date. To identify missing information, we merged in the Schedule Table,
which codes “CY” or “Custody” to signify the custody proceeding. If the judge was still missing
even after merging in the Schedule Table, we used the judge listed in the Proceeding Table if the
date of the bond proceeding seemed consistent with the completion date of the removal
proceeding.
151. Prior to 2005, most bond hearings were coded as “BD” or “bond redeterminations”
proceedings. After 2005, most proceedings were coded as “BB” or “custody redeterminations.”
See What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond in Immigration Court Proceedings?,
TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 14, 2016), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/438 [https://
perma.cc/XDA4-TMNM] (noting a shift in coding twenty years ago). We treated BB and BD
bond type proceedings the same. “SB” proceedings indicate a subsequent bond hearing after one
was already heard. Many of these subsequent cases were coded as bond type “SB.” However, we
found that some cases were coded as “SB” even if they were the only bond proceeding for a given
noncitizen, so this variable alone was not useful in identifying the first substantive case. Rather,
the data had to be sorted by case and proceeding IDs, the bond completion date (“comp_date”),
and the hearing time (“hearing_time”). If there were two bond hearings on the same day, we
included the decision labeled as the “BB” or “BD” bond type proceeding as the first substantive
case and considered the hearing labeled “SB” as the second substantive outcome.
152. To identify custody cases, we relied on the Case Table as well as the Custody Table and
Proceeding Table. Noncitizens coded as “N” were never detained, while those coded “R” or “D”
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been detained but sought review over the conditions for their release;
it is also possible that those cases were erroneously coded. Seventh, we
eliminated cases coded as involving family units or juveniles on the
ground that IJ decisions on bond will differ systematically in cases
involving family units or juveniles.153
The reliability of the data is unclear. If the bond amount was below
the statutory minimum of $1,500, we made it $1,500. Most observations
included a bond decision, but many did not record a bond amount. We
found many internal inconsistencies in EOIR’s coding on the old and
new bond amounts. For example, some cases coded as a “no bond” or
“own recognizance” decision actually had an amount listed in the “new
bond” column. We treated such decisions as no bond or own
recognizance cases, opining that the “bond decision” variable was
coded accurately. In addition, we imputed IJ bond amounts based on
the bond decision. If the IJ bond amount was missing but the ICE bond
amount was filled in with the decision being “no action” or “no
change,” we imputed the ICE amount as the amount for new bond
cases, and vice versa.154 If bond amounts were missing, it was unclear if
the IJ sought to issue a lower or higher bond, or if the IJ set a bond
amount for the first time if ICE had denied bond. We assumed that if
the noncitizen was released, the IJ lowered bond. If the information for
the initial ICE bond amount was still missing, we imputed the median
ICE bond based on the court base city in which the hearing took place
and the presidential era. For missing IJ bond amounts, we imputed the
median amount set by that IJ for the presidential era. We did the
imputations on the truncated dataset. The bond amounts presented

were detained but released, or detained, respectively. Where the Custody Table included multiple
entries, we compared the dates for the bond completion and the date released or detained.
153. See supra note 64. To identify juveniles, we relied on both the Juvenile Table and the
Lead and Rider Tables. We assumed that rider cases involved juveniles. EOIR’s coding
identifying juvenile cases is unclear, so we only eliminated the cases with a juvenile ID from the
Juvenile Table (other than if coded “NA” or “Not Applicable”) or who had a case ID from either
the Lead or Rider Tables. Some analysis has suggested this is underinclusive of all juveniles. See
NINA SIULC, ZHIFEN CHENG, ARNOLD SON & OLGA BYRNE, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL
ORIENTATION PROGRAM: EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENT
REPORT, PHASE II, at 79 (2008), https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/legal-orientationprogram-evaluation-and-performance-and-outcome-measurement-report-phase-ii/legacy_downloads
/LOP_evalution_updated_5-20-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z5B-PCV8]. We eliminated all rider
cases as well as all lead cases that had a rider case, assuming that lead cases involved family units.
154. The American Civil Liberties Union made this assumption. See ACLU, IMMIGRATION
BOND ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY 2, https://www.aclu.org/report/immigration-bond-analysismethodology [https://perma.cc/DW4E-R53K].
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exclude what we perceive to be erroneously coded bond amounts for
no bond, own recognizance, or lack of jurisdiction outcomes.

